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Abstract  
 
Studies show that high IQ people practice healthier lifestyles, which result in better 
health status. However, do such people spend more on healthcare? We employed hierarchical 
multiple regression analysis to examine the impact of national average IQ on private health 
expenditure, especially health insurance at cross-country level. Controlling for income, the 
old-age dependency ratio, and government expenditure on health, we found that IQ was 
positively significant on out-of-pocket healthcare expenditure but negatively associated with 
private health insurance expenditure. We suggest that high IQ societies pay less for health 
insurance because they are more capable of preventing illnesses or injuries and they live in 
healthier and safer environments, which are less vulnerable to diseases. In addition, they are 
more efficient at calculating risk and making choices according to their future healthcare 
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needs. Hence, with price dispersion and various choices of premium schemes available within 
the health insurance industry, high IQ people may be more efficient at obtaining lower 
effective prices of premiums.  
 
Keywords: health insurance; income; intelligence; national IQ; private health expenditure; 
public health 
JEL Classifications: H51, I13, I25, J24 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Intelligence (IQ) is a significant predictor of important life outcomes across domains. 
High IQ people learn faster, and are more efficient and innovative at problem-solving tasks, 
which results in enhanced job performance (Byington & Felps, 2010; Schmidt & Hunter, 
2004), and consequently higher productivity at both individual and national levels (Hanushek 
& Kimko, 2000; Jones & Schneider, 2006, 2010; Ram, 2007; Weede & Kämpf, 2002). People 
with higher IQ have positive personalities, for example, they are more inclined to cooperate, 
more patient (i.e., less delay discounting), and more perceptive to gaining better rewards over 
a longer time horizon (Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, & Sunde, 2010; Jones, 2008; Shamosh & 
Gray, 2008). Therefore, at cross-country levels, societies with higher IQs have higher savings 
rates and enjoy less corruption (Jones, 2012; Potrafke, 2012). 
 
Unlike pre-modern societies in which people with low IQs and childlike mentality are 
dominant, high IQ people in modern populations are more capable of understanding concepts 
and causal relationships, and therefore, they are able to think and act more rationally about 
overcoming poor health and preventing the spread of diseases (Oesterdiekhoff, 2012; 
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Oesterdiekhoff & Rindermann, 2007; Rindermann, Falkenhayn, & Baumeister, 2014). High 
IQ people are associated with a better quality of life and healthier lifestyle practices (e.g., 
Batty, Deary, Schoon, & Gale, 2007; Jelenkovic, Silventoinen, Tynelius, & Rasmussen, 
2014). Therefore, they have better health status, such as greater longevity and less mortality 
risk (Batty, Deary, & Gottfredson, 2007; Gottfredson & Deary, 2004). In addition, high IQ is 
associated with higher socioeconomic status, which assures better healthcare as well 
(Gottfredson & Deary, 2004). This study attempts to examine the effect of national average 
IQ on private expenditure on health, especially health insurance. Naturally, health insurance is 
associated with uncertainty of future healthcare needs. Policyholders would lose money spent 
on insurance premiums if they were not sick. Conversely, if individuals became sick when 
they were not covered by insurance, they might not have enough savings to support their out-
of-pocket expenditure on health treatment. In the latter case, health insurance would cover 
policyholders by more than their savings would have.  
 
As out-of-pocket expenditure on health is the most common type of health financing 
in developing nations and is a major financial burden for households, private health insurance 
provides access to financial protection by offering households an option to avoid huge out-of-
pocket expenses (Sekhri & Savedoff, 2005). Along the same line, the relationship between 
national IQ and private health expenditure, particularly health insurance, has not been 
established yet. Because high IQ people are characterized as being more perceptive, have 
longer time horizons, and lead healthier lifestyles, it may be assumed that high IQ people are 
more likely to spend on health insurance to maintain their good health continuously and in 
preparation for health deterioration in old age. IQ may serve as a source of advantageous 
selection because it improves people‟s knowledge about health risks. High IQ people may be 
healthier, but at the same time, they may be more perceptive about potential health risks 
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(Fang, Keane, & Silverman, 2008). For this reason, our study adds to the literature by 
establishing the impact of IQ on private health expenditure, particularly health insurance at a 
cross-country level.  
 
2. Methods 
 
2.1 Variables and Model  
 
Values for private health expenditure for each country are the average of people‟s 
expenditure on their own healthcare needs. Therefore, similar to average IQ test scores within 
a national society, we assume that an individual‟s decision on health expenditure is 
independent of other individuals‟ health expenditure. To investigate the impact of national IQ 
on private expenditure on health insurance, we set our dependent variable as private health 
insurance expenditure per capita at country level, namely Insurance. In addition, we employ 
two other measures of health expenditure as comparative models for Insurance, namely, 
Total, which is total private health expenditure per capita, and Pocket, the out-of-pocket 
health expenditure per capita. Out-of-pocket expenditure is any direct expenditure by 
households, which includes gratuities and in-kind outlays paid to health practitioners and 
suppliers of pharmaceuticals, therapeutic appliances, and other goods and services whose 
main purpose is to add to the restoration or improvement of the health status of individuals or 
population groups (World Bank, 2014). The value of Total is composed of the value of 
Pocket, Insurance, and other unspecified variables; however, Pocket forms the largest 
proportion of Total, about 70% (World Bank, 2014). To investigate the impact of IQ on 
healthcare expenditure, we employed a linear macro-model as follows: 
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where Expenditure denotes expenditure for three dependent variables, that is, Total, Pocket, 
and Insurance, which were incorporated separately into the model. Income denotes gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita for country i. People with higher income are willing to 
spend more on their healthcare (Chernew, Hirth, & Cutler, 2003). Gov is general government 
expenditure on health as a percentage of total health expenditure. We expect that the effect of 
Gov on health expenditure variables will control the effect of Income because people would 
spend less on healthcare if their governments were willing to subsidize healthcare more. 
Age65 is the percentage of the population aged 65 years and older. It is expected that an 
increase in Age65 would increase both average private health expenditure and out-of-pocket 
expenditure owing to more health treatment needed during old age (Yang, Norton, & Stearns, 
2003). Moreover, we expect that a higher value for Age65 would influence younger 
generations to spend more on insurance in preparation for their own morbidity in old age. We 
suggest that Age65 is a better variable to use than the common “life expectancy at birth” 
variable because the latter does not represent the current old age population. Data on Total, 
Pocket, Insurance, Income, and Gov were obtained from the World Health Organization‟s 
Global Health Expenditure Database (World Health Organization, 2014), while the data on 
Age65 were obtained from the World Bank‟s World Development Indicators (World Bank, 
2014). IQ is the national average intelligence for a specific country i, obtained from 
Meisenberg and Lynn (2011). Except for IQ data, which are purely cross-sectional, the data 
for the other variables were averaged over the years 1995–2012.1 Finally, ei is an error term. 
                                                          
1
 One may be influenced to take in variables of healthcare facilities (e.g., the number of private hospitals, 
hospital beds, and physicians per capita) as predictors of Insurance because an increasing number in these 
facilities may indicate an improvement in private care, which may induce people to demand more for health 
insurance (e.g., Propper, Rees, & Green, 2001; Shin, 2012). However, there are many supportive arguments in 
the literature for the view that their relationship exists in an opposite direction, in which greater levels of private 
 6 
 
Data on Total, Pocket, Insurance, and Income were log transformed because increased 
healthcare expenditure and wealth at lower levels would have been more essential than at 
higher levels (Rindermann & Thompson, 2011). Finally, all data (including the log-
transformed variables) were standardized to a standard deviation of one. Data analyses were 
performed using EViews 8.1. Table 1 shows the list of selected countries ranked by all 
variables. 
 
[Insert Table 1 here]  
 
In this study, more than 107 countries were selected based on the availability of data. 
Four countries, namely, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Luxembourg, the United States 
(US), and Switzerland, were excluded from our analysis as they are potentially outliers. In 
particular, the UAE was excluded from our analysis because its value for Age65 was too low, 
that is .774%, as 80% of its population comprises working-age immigrants (DubaiFAQs, 
2015). Luxembourg was excluded from the entire analysis because its value for Income was 
too high, that is, US$75,090.81. For Total, the US (US$3,421.98) and Switzerland 
(US$2,184.21) were excluded. For Insurance, the US (US$2,098.50) was excluded. 
 
2.2 Spatial Autocorrelation, Race, and Health  
 
In a cross-national study, data points are not exactingly independent because 
neighboring countries are likely to share similar characteristics (Meisenberg & Woodley, 
2014). Therefore, p-values are inflated by nonindependence of data points because we are 
dealing with geographic data. This is caused by spatial autocorrelation, without any causal 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
health insurance coverage will drive further growth of healthcare industries (e.g., McClellan et al., 2002; Shin, 
2012; Simoens & Hurst, 2006; Van Doorslaer, Masseria, & OECD Health Equity Research Group, 2004). 
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effects of the independent variables that the regression models suggest (Eff, 2004). Spatial 
autocorrelation is well documented in economics literature, in which three geographical 
regions are significant for global productivity, namely, East Asia, Latin America, and Africa. 
In particular, Sala-i-Martin (1997) and Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer, and Miller (2004) found 
that the inclusion of East Asian countries into cross-national growth regression is positively 
significant for global productivity growth. By contrast, both Latin America and Africa were 
found to be negatively significant. This method has been adopted by Jones and Schneider 
(2006) to examine whether IQ is significant on productivity growth at cross-country level.  
 
We suggest that excluding one of the three regions (i.e., East Asia, Latin America, or 
Africa) at a time is important not only because of their spatial autocorrelation, but most 
importantly, because the populations of neighboring countries in each region are blood-related 
and relatively more homogenous in their biological inheritance. Each race is susceptible to the 
same disease, or has the same risk level of having the disease; in addition, they share similar 
health-related behavior (Bamshad, 2005; Batai & Kittles, 2013; LaVeist, 1994). Therefore, 
different races may have different levels of affinity or needs for health insurance and medical 
care. Moreover, differences in culture and values among races may also influence their levels 
of affinity for health care and services (Dressler, 1993; Hunt, Schneider, & Comer, 2004). For 
this reason, inequalities in health and healthcare associated with race are well recognized and 
have been a focus of many health-related organizations (Cheng et al., 2015).  
 
In our cross-national study, to alleviate the effect of race and spatial autocorrelation on 
private health insurance expenditure, we exclude one of the three world regions (i.e., East 
Asia, Latin America, or Africa) at a time from our analysis. In addition, Jones and Schneider 
(2010) provided a useful insight that oil-rich countries in the Middle East have very modest 
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levels of IQ relative to their exceptionally high income owing to a huge increase in the price 
of oil exports. In particular, we found that the national IQ of oil-rich countries of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council, namely, Bahrain (IQ=85.6), Kuwait (IQ=85.3), Oman (IQ=84.4), Qatar 
(IQ=80.1), and Saudi Arabia (IQ=79.5) are not greater than the world‟s average IQ, although 
they are listed among the world‟s richest countries as measured by GDP per capita (World 
Bank, 2014).
2,3
 Persian Gulf countries differ from the global pattern because their economies 
are associated entirely with oil production, and therefore, there is a controversy as to whether 
these countries should be incorporated into a pooled model (Anagnosto & Panteladis, 2014; 
Bahmani-Oskooee & Kandil, 2010; García, 2013; Mankiw, Romer, & Weil, 1992; Ross, 
2009; Takebe & York, 2011). The Persian Gulf produced about 28% of the world's oil supply, 
and about 55% of the world's crude oil reserves (Marcon International, 2015). Mankiw et al. 
(1992), for example, have excluded the entire Persian Gulf countries from their cross-country 
growth regression. We suggest that an unmeasurable qualitative factor could exist, in which 
excessive wealth of this oil kingdom has led its societies to extravagant expenditure and 
lifestyles (El Ghonemy, 1998, pp. 140–142; Kraidy & Khalil, 2008, p. 340; Moghadam & 
Decker, 2010, p. 81; Whetter, 2000), and which is independent of its IQ levels. Hence, in 
addition to the three world regions of East Asia, Latin America, and Africa, we also consider 
excluding this Persian Gulf region from our analysis.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2
 We averaged Meisenberg and Lynn‟s (2011) national IQ for 169 countries and found that the world‟s average 
IQ is equal to 85.52. 
3
 Out of 222 countries listed by the World Bank (2014), these 5 countries are listed among the 17 countries with 
the world‟s highest GDP per capita, averaged for the 1995–2012 period. 
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3. Results  
 
Table 2 shows the correlation matrix for all variables. All correlation values are 
positive and significant at p<.001. Because IQ and Age65 are extremely correlated at r=.78, 
we suggest that our model must be simplified, and these two variables cannot be put together 
in the same regression model owing to multi-collinearity. Table 3 shows the correlation 
values between IQ and six variables for two country groups, which are median splits for each 
variable. Five out of the six variables are Total, Pocket, Insurance, Income, and Age65.
4
 The 
sixth variable is Growth, that is, the annual growth rate (%) of real GDP per capita for 122 
countries, which was averaged for the 1970–2010 period. The growth rate of real GDP per 
capita is often employed in studies of IQ and productivity growth at a cross-country level 
(e.g., Jones & Schneider, 2006; Ram, 2007; Weede & Kämpf, 2002). As shown in Table 3, 
we found that IQ was not significantly correlated with Growth for the country group of higher 
economic growth rate. On the other hand, IQ correlation values are more consistent (p<.001) 
for Total, Pocket, Insurance, Income, and Age65 rather than for Growth between their two 
country groups. This would challenge the reliability of the IQ–Growth relationship that has 
emerged in the literature.  
  
[Insert Table 2 here]  
 
[Insert Table 3 here]  
 
Tables 4, 5, and 6 show the results of our regression analyses for three dependent 
variables, namely Total, Pocket, and Insurance, respectively. For Models 1–4 throughout the 
                                                          
4
 It has been well-documented in the literature that IQ is significant in predicting the level of GDP per capita 
(Lynn & Vanhanen, 2002, 2006) and survival in old age (Murray, Pattie, Starr, & Deary, 2012; Whalley & 
Deary, 2001).  
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three tables, we found that all variables were significantly positive at p<.001 for Total, 
Pocket, and Insurance in their bivariate regressions. Income alone explains more than 85% of 
the variation in Total and Pocket but only 68% of the variation in Insurance. The coefficients 
of determination (R
2
s) on Insurance for Age65 and IQ were half of the R
2
s on Total and 
Pocket (Models 3 and 4). For Tables 4–6, the coefficient values for Gov were significantly 
negative when controlled for Income. Although Age65 was highly significant for Total and 
Pocket in their full regression models (Tables 4 and 5; Model 6), we found that it was 
nonsignificant for Insurance (Table 6; Model 6). In contrast to Age65, we found that IQ was 
nonsignificant for Total (Table 4; Model 7) but positively significant (p<.01) for Pocket 
(Table 5; Model 7). In addition, IQ was significant for Insurance at the p<.05 significance 
level when controlled for all other predictor variables (Table 6; Model 7). Overall, Income 
had the strongest effect on health expenditure variables, and thus, it was least affected when 
controlled for Gov, Age65, and IQ.  
 
We found that there is only a small difference between the R
2
s of Total and Pocket, 
with both showing adjusted R
2
 values of around .92–.95 (Tables 4 and 5; Model 6 and 7). This 
occurs because Pocket contributes most to the Total‟s share. Moreover, because the adjusted 
R
2
 of Insurance (Table 6; Model 6 and 7; Adj. R
2
=.70) is smaller than that of Total (Table 4; 
Model 6 and 7; adj. R
2
=.95) and that of Pocket (Table 5; Model 6 and 7; adj. R
2
=.94), we 
suggest that those predictor variables can better explain Total and Pocket than Insurance. 
 
[Insert Table 4 here]  
 
[Insert Table 5 here]  
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[Insert Table 6 here]  
 
Table 7 shows a summary of regression analysis for Insurance after we excluded one 
of the regions at a time. We found that IQ retained its significance at the 5% level after 
excluding East Asia or Latin America, but it became nonsignificant after excluding Africa 
from the sample. Moreover, IQ became significant at the p<.01 level after we excluded the 
Persian Gulf from the analysis.  
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
Because only five oil-rich countries had a large impact on our results, we performed 
additional regressions in which Persian Gulf and one of the three other world regions (i.e., 
East Asia, Latin America, or Africa) were excluded together from our analysis. As shown in 
Table 8, we found that IQ was significant at the 1% level on Insurance in all models. 
Surprisingly, the effect of IQ became more significant than Gov, which was reduced to the 
p<.05 significance level. This was in contrast with Table 6 (Model 7), in which Gov (p<.01) 
outshone IQ (p<.05) in significance level. With increased values of adjusted R
2‟s (.72–.76), 
we suggest that the exclusion of the Persian Gulf was significant to strengthen the negative 
relationship between IQ and private health insurance expenditure after controlling for Income 
and Gov. This provides support that economies of the Persian Gulf countries are different to 
those of the broader global pattern.  
 
 [Insert Table 8 here] 
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4. Discussion 
 
There are two key findings of this study. First, Age65 was significant for Total and 
Pocket but nonsignificant for Insurance. This is because growth in longevity or the proportion 
of a society‟s old population would lead to increases in both private health expenditure and 
out-of-pocket expenditure as, on average, a society would spend more on healthcare for 
individuals in old age owing to morbidity (Lakdawalla, Goldman, & Shang, 2005; Lubitz, 
Cai, Kramarow, & Lentzner, 2003; Yang et al., 2003). Because Age65 was more significant 
than IQ in raising health expenditure (i.e., Total and Pocket), and Age65 and IQ were highly 
correlated (r=.78), it could be that these three variables are more suitable to interact in the 
following path model: IQ → Age65 → Total / Pocket. However, Age65 was nonsignificant on 
Insurance, thus, implying that population longevity is not a basis for society to spend more on 
private health insurance. Along the same vein, we consider that the risk of poor health or 
morbidity in old age does not influence the general community to buy health insurance. 
Therefore, this suggests that people spend more on private health insurance to fulfill their 
healthcare needs throughout all stages of life, not only during old age. 
 
Second, IQ was positively significant for Pocket but negatively significant for 
Insurance. This shows that high IQ societies have experienced higher out-of-pocket 
expenditure to improve their health. However, we suggest that financial factors, such as 
personal income and government financial support, along with health deterioration and 
noncommunicable diseases (e.g., chronic diseases, like cancer, cardiovascular diseases, 
chronic respiratory diseases, diabetes, and hypertension) during old age (age>65 years) are 
more important factors than IQ in determining out-of-pocket expenditure on health. The 
exceptional significance of Income on all health expenditure is not surprising because 
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healthcare involves a substantial financial commitment throughout a person‟s lifespan, 
especially during illnesses. For this reason, the effect of Gov on private health expenditure 
variables was negatively significant, implying that the size of private expenditure on health 
would decrease with an increasing proportion of government financial support for public 
healthcare. 
 
Private health insurance is generally expensive, and thus, is undertaken mostly by 
people with higher income rather than the poor (Gertler & Sturm, 1997; Sekhri & Savedoff, 
2005). Therefore, the significant effects of the financial variables Income and Gov on 
insurance expenditure should be unquestionable. However, the observation of a negatively 
significant effect of IQ on health insurance was surprising. When the oil-rich Persian Gulf 
countries were excluded from our analysis, IQ became more significant (p<.01) than Gov 
(p<.05). The fitness of the model with the adjusted R
2
 value was greater than .70, which was 
good enough to verify that the negative effect of IQ on Insurance really exists. If a model 
were to be employed efficiently for predictive function, an R
2
 greater than .70 would be ideal, 
given that it is difficult to obtain a high R
2
 using cross-sectional data rather than time-series 
data (Doran, 1989, pp. 85–86). This finding refutes our earlier postulation that IQ may be 
associated positively with expenditure on health insurance based on the facts that high IQ 
individuals have healthier lifestyles and are more patient and perceptive to gaining better 
rewards in the future. Hence, one may question why high IQ societies have spent less on 
private health insurance. 
 
In this study, we suggest three reasons that may explain our findings on IQ and private 
health insurance expenditure. First, high IQ individuals may have a higher level of sensation 
seeking, which brings about risky behavior, even on their own health (White & Batty, 2012). 
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Sensation seeking is the biological basis of individual differences, which involves the 
“seeking of varied, novel, complex, and intense sensations and experiences, and the 
willingness to take physical, social, legal, and financial risks for the sake of such experience” 
(Zuckerman, 1994, p. 27). High IQ individuals are associated with higher degrees of sensation 
seeking and openness to experiences (Aitken Harris, 2004; Raine, Reynolds, Venables, & 
Mednick, 2002; Wainwright, Wright, Luciano, Geffen, & Martin, 2008). For example, some 
studies have reported that people with higher IQs during childhood may increase the risk of 
illegal drug and alcohol dependency and excess alcohol intake in adulthood (e.g., Batty et al., 
2008; Hatch et al., 2007; White & Batty, 2012). People who engage in riskier behaviors are 
significantly less likely to purchase insurance (Cutler, Finkelstein, & McGarry, 2008). In 
relation to our findings, we suggest that high IQ societies may have risked their future 
healthcare coverage by paying less toward health insurance schemes in the current period. In 
other words, high IQ people risk receiving insufficient health insurance coverage for their 
future healthcare needs. This is consistent with the classical model of insurance demand, in 
which high risk takers would demand less insurance, in contrast to risk-averse agents who 
would demand more (Mossin, 1968; Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1976).  
 
Second, higher IQ individuals have a higher capacity to estimate their future returns 
and health outcomes than those with lower IQs. In many circumstances, high IQ is associated 
with less biased risk-taking behavior (Benjamin, Brown, & Shapiro, 2013). In relation to this, 
it should be borne in mind that high IQ people may have decided on health insurance based 
on their own calculated risks. Higher IQ raises an individual‟s capacity to integrate a broad 
range of choices by taking into consideration the risks and expected value of future returns 
(Dohmen et al., 2010). For instance, high IQ investors have been observed to have superior 
market timing and to be more competent at diversifying their portfolios in both mutual funds 
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and stock markets for profits (Grinblatt, Keloharju, & Linnainmaa, 2011, 2012). Therefore, 
higher IQ is not only associated with a reduced number of errors in making right choices but 
is also linked to a greater willingness to take calculated risks (Agarwal & Mazumder, 2013; 
Burks, Carpenter, Goette, & Rustichini, 2009; Christelis, Jappelli, & Padula, 2010; Frederick, 
2005). In the case of our findings, it is worthwhile to suggest that high IQ societies may have 
anticipated that it is not worthwhile for them to spend more on health insurance. A possible 
reason is that high IQ societies have less prevalence of diseases (e.g., HIV, heart disease, 
diabetes, obesity, stroke, and high blood pressure), and thus, they tend to have better health 
status and are less vulnerable to morbidity and mortality risk (Lynn & Vanhanen, 2012; Pesta, 
Bertsch, McDaniel, Mahoney, & Poznanski, 2012). This is in contrast to least-developed low-
IQ societies with a proportionally higher probability of diseases and illnesses that raise the 
cost of insurance premiums (Chernew et al., 2003). In addition, higher IQ is associated with 
higher educational attainment, which, in turn, is associated with higher social rank and better 
occupational status, thereby promising safer and less risky living and working environments 
(Batty et al., 2009; Deary & Der, 2005). Furthermore, high IQ results in enhanced 
management of healthcare because it signifies superior learning, reasoning, and problem-
solving skills that are beneficial in preventing accidental injury and chronic disease and in 
sticking firmly to complex treatment regimens (Batty et al., 2009; Gottfredson & Deary, 
2004). Finally, we suggest that future studies may control all of these factors when examining 
the impact of IQ on private health expenditure, especially health insurance.  
 
The third reason to explain our findings on IQ and private health insurance 
expenditure warrants serious consideration. In relation to health insurance premium, we 
assume that both policyholders (with a broad range of IQ levels) and insurance companies 
agree on buying and selling premiums, respectively, based on their own calculated risks and 
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expected returns, which are determined independently between the two parties. However, 
with price dispersion and various choices of premium schemes available within the health 
insurance industry, IQ may serve as a source of advantageous selection through its effect on 
people‟s capacity to integrate a broad range of choices and evaluate the costs and benefits of 
purchasing premiums (Fang et al., 2008). Considering that high IQ is associated with greater 
efficiency at calculating risk and making choices, therefore, high IQ people spend less on 
health insurance because they are more efficient at obtaining lower effective prices of 
insurance premiums. Our findings provide support to Fang et al. (2008, p. 340), who 
hypothesized that “premiums paid by individuals with higher cognitive ability should tend to 
be lower than those paid by individuals with lower cognitive ability.” Owing to this, it is 
worthwhile to consider that premiums would benefit those who had effectively predetermined 
their future returns or healthcare needs. However, further studies are required to examine 
whether the relationships between policyholders and insurance industry are associated to the 
theory of “homo economicus,” in which human beings are rational and completely motivated 
by self-interest to maximize their utility as consumers and economic profit as producers, or 
being motivated principally by the desire to cooperate and enhance their environment, as 
advocated by the proponents of “homo reciprocans” (Gintis, 2000). After all, a limitation in 
our study is that an ecological fallacy occurs when conclusions about the personality of 
individuals are made based on analyses of group data to which those individuals belong 
(Krieger, 2014; Oleckno, 2008, p. 238). Therefore, in conclusion, we hope that further studies 
will scrutinize the role of IQ as a source of advantageous selection, and verify whether the 
prosperity of the insurance industry is associated with the IQ of their policyholders.  
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Table 1 
List of countries with top and bottom10 rankings for all variables. 
 
Total
a
 
(N=142) 
Pocket
b
 
(N=143) 
Insurance
c
 
(N=108) 
Income
d
 
(N=143) 
Gov
e
 
(N=143) 
Age65
f
 
(N=143) 
IQ
g
 
(N=143) 
10 Countries 
at Highest 
Ranking 
Norway: 978.22 
Australia: 974.30 
Canada: 973.67 
Austria: 951.51 
Netherlands: 904.77 
Ireland: 866.11 
Iceland: 847.97 
Belgium: 794.15 
Germany: 791.69 
France: 778.11 
Norway: 881.97 
USA: 814.16 
Iceland: 808.33 
Cyprus: 673.71 
Belgium: 648.56 
Greece: 626.47 
Denmark: 622.15 
Austria: 589.13 
Finland: 583.34 
Singapore: 582.55 
Switzerland: 527.54 
France: 462.69 
Netherlands: 420.46 
Canada: 398.08 
Germany: 314.74 
Ireland: 289.50 
Australia: 244.73 
S. Africa 182.66 
Austria: 182.46 
Slovenia: 173.11 
Norway: 62514.04 
Qatar: 52233.59 
Iceland: 49901.35 
Denmark: 45602.19 
Ireland: 43059.10 
USA: 40273.56 
Sweden: 38686.10 
Netherlands: 38251.17 
Austria: 36699.54 
U. Kingdom: 35524.18 
Cuba: 91.99 
Seychelles: 89.05 
Czech Rep.: 87.82 
Croatia: 84.69 
Denmark: 84.10 
Norway: 83.73 
Sweden: 82.96 
Iceland: 81.85 
Oman: 81.75 
Japan: 81.27 
Japan: 19.16 
Italy: 19.00 
Germany: 18.16 
Greece: 17.71 
Sweden: 17.58 
Bulgaria: 17.12 
Belgium: 16.97 
Portugal: 16.81 
Spain: 16.71 
Latvia: 16.37 
Singapore: 106.9 
China: 105.9 
S. Korea: 104.8 
Japan: 104.1 
Finland: 100.8 
Canada: 100.4 
Netherlands: 100.4 
Mongolia: 100 
Estonia: 99.8 
N. Zealand: 99.3 
10 Countries 
at Lowest 
Ranking 
Bangladesh: 8.30 
Cent. Afr. Rep.: 7.77 
P. N. Guinea: 7.31 
Mozambique: 7.18 
Burundi: 6.95 
Madagascar: 6.60 
Malawi: 6.00 
Congo: 5.53 
Eritrea: 4.66 
Ethiopia: 3.34 
Gambia: 5.50 
Madagascar: 5.19 
Burundi: 4.85 
Eritrea: 4.66 
Rwanda: 4.39 
Congo: 4.00 
P. N. Guinea: 3.95 
Ethiopia: 2.67 
Malawi: 2.63 
Mozambique: 1.64 
Malawi: 0.71 
Egypt: 0.71 
Zambia: 0.68 
Burkina Faso: 0.61 
Congo: 0.58 
Madagascar: 0.58 
Sudan: 0.54 
P. N. Guinea: 0.54 
Niger: 0.53 
Yemen: 0.50 
Guinea: 295.40 
Mozambique: 293.99 
Madagascar: 277.60 
Rwanda: 269.54 
Niger: 256.26 
Eritrea: 228.14 
Malawi: 225.54 
Ethiopia: 168.75 
Congo: 152.42 
Burundi: 151.76 
Uganda: 26.15 
Côte d‟Ivoire: 26.14 
Pakistan: 25.87 
India: 25.72 
Cameroon: 24.18 
Congo: 22.32 
Guinea: 21.04 
Azerbaijan: 18.84 
Georgia: 17.33 
S. Leone: 16.00 
Gambia: 2.62 
P. N. Guinea: 2.60 
Uganda: 2.57 
Rwanda: 2.55 
Niger: 2.54 
S. Leone 2.52 
Oman: 2.40 
Bahrain: 2.27 
Eritrea: 1.92 
Qatar: 1.40 
Cameroon: 68.2 
Congo: 68 
Benin: 67.7 
Chad: 67.1 
Guinea: 66.5 
Cent. Afr. Rep.: 64 
S. Leone: 64 
Gambia: 62 
Malawi: 61.9 
Niger: 61.2 
Mean 187.795 (1.859) 142.402 (1.747) 48.889 (.978) 9223.163 (3.501) 55.742 7.562 85.019 
Median 82.403 (1.916) 58.474 (1.767) 7.770 (.890) 3427.812 (3.535) 57.320 5.444 85.000 
Std. Dev. 260.220 (.636) 197.273 (.638) 98.860 (.836) 13264.22 (.686) 18.050 5.029 10.788 
Skewness 1.741 (.090) 1.889 (-.034) 3.077 (.249) 1.853 (.035) -.101 .784 -.184 
Kurtosis 4.845 (2.066) 5.750 (2.260) 12.524 (2.023) 5.621 (2.026) 2.115 2.183 2.224 
Jarque-Bera 91.877 (5.350) 130.080 (3.287) 578.600 (5.409) 122.813 (5.684) 4.906 18.643 4.400 
Note: Values in parentheses denote the data after log transformation.  
a
 Total is total private health expenditure per capita (in constant 2005 US$) (averaged 1995–2012). 
b
 Pocket is out-of-pocket health expenditure per capita (in constant 2005 US$) (averaged 1995–2012). 
c 
Insurance is private health insurance expenditure per capita (in constant 2005 US$) (averaged 1995–2012).  
d
 Income is gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (in constant 2005 US$) (averaged 1995–2012). 
e 
Gov is general government expenditure on health as a percentage of total health expenditure (averaged 1995–2012). 
f 
Age65 is the percentage (%) of the population aged 65 years and older (averaged 1995–2012).  
g 
IQ is national average intelligence.  
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Table 2 
Correlation matrix for all variables (N=107).  
 
 Total Pocket Insurance Income Gov Age65 IQ 
Total
a
 -       
Pocket
b
 .966*** -      
Insurance
c
 .875*** .760*** -     
Income
d
 .929*** .905*** .819*** -    
Gov
e
 .354*** .316*** .365*** .588*** -   
Age65
f
 .679*** .693*** .471*** .638*** .459*** -  
IQ
g
 .697*** .723*** .500*** .717*** .447*** .780*** - 
Note: Total, Pocket, Insurance, and Income were log transformed.  
*** p<.001, ** p<.01, and * p<.05. 
a
 Total is total private health expenditure per capita (in constant 2005 US$) (averaged 1995–2012). 
b
 Pocket is out-of-pocket health expenditure per capita (in constant 2005 US$) (averaged 1995–2012). 
c 
Insurance is private health insurance expenditure per capita (in constant 2005 US$) (averaged 1995–2012).  
d
 Income is gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (in constant 2005 US$) (averaged 1995–2012). 
e 
Gov is general government expenditure on health as a percentage of total health expenditure (averaged 1995–2012). 
f 
Age65 is the percentage (%) of the population aged 65 years and older (averaged 1995–2012).  
g 
IQ is national average intelligence. 
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Table 3  
Correlation between IQ and selected variables; median-splits.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables Country Groups 
Correlation, r 
with IQ 
Total
 a
 
High Total .553*** 
Low Total .453*** 
Pocket
b
 
High Pocket .586*** 
Low Pocket  .436*** 
Insurance
c
 
High Insurance .411*** 
Low Insurance  .473*** 
Income
d
 
High Income  .593*** 
Low Income  .644*** 
Age65
e
 
High  Age65  .623*** 
Low  Age65  .416*** 
Growth
f
 
High Growth .132 
Low Growth .550*** 
Note:  Total, Pocket, Insurance, and Income were log 
transformed.  
*** p<.001, ** p<.01, and * p<.05. 
a
 Total is total private health expenditure per capita (in constant 
2005 US$) (averaged 1995–2012). 
b
 Pocket is out-of-pocket health expenditure per capita (in 
constant 2005 US$) (averaged 1995–2012). 
c 
Insurance is private health insurance expenditure per capita 
(in constant 2005 US$) (averaged 1995–2012).  
d
 Income is gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (in 
constant 2005 US$) (averaged 1995–2012). 
e 
Age65 is the percentage (%) of the population aged 65 years 
and older (averaged 1995–2012).  
f 
Growth is the annual growth rate of real GDP per capita, 
which was averaged for the 1970–2010 period. Data on Growth 
are obtained from the Penn World Table 7.1 (Heston, 
Summers, & Aten, 2012). 
 27 
 
Table 4 
Summary of regression analysis where private expenditure of health acts as a dependent variable (N=142).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable:  total private health expenditure per capita, Total 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Income .942***    1.132*** 1.035*** 1.102*** 
Gov  .440***   -.293*** -.316*** -.297*** 
Age65   .710***   .162***  
IQ    .709***   .042 
        
R
2 
.887 .193 .505 .503 .937 .951 .938 
Adj. R
2
 .887 .188 .501 .499 .936 .949 .937 
Note: Regression coefficients are standardized betas. All regressions are estimated using White‟s 
heteroskedasticity correction.  
*** p<.001, ** p<.01, and * p<.05. 
Reading example:  As Model 6 shows, a one standard deviation increase in Age65 would increase Total 
by a standard deviation of .162.  
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Table 5 
Summary of regression analysis where out-of-pocket expenditure acts as a dependent variable (N=143).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable:  out-of-pocket health expenditure per capita, Pocket 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Income .925***    1.127*** 1.001*** 1.045*** 
Gov  .396***   -.318*** -.347*** -.327*** 
Age65   .722***   .208***  
IQ    .730***   .116** 
        
R
2 
.856 .157 .521 .533 .916 .938 .922 
Adj. R
2
 .855 .151 .517 .529 .915 .937 .921 
Note: Regression coefficients are standardized betas. All regressions are estimated using White‟s 
heteroskedasticity correction. 
*** p<.001, ** p<.01, and * p<.05. 
Reading example:  As Model 7 shows, a one standard deviation increase in IQ would increase Pocket 
by a standard deviation of .116.  
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Table 6 
Summary of regression analysis where private health insurance acts as a dependent variable (N=108).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable:  private health insurance expenditure per capita, Insurance 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Income .824***    .931*** .961*** 1.042*** 
Gov  .345***   -.187** -.180** -.177** 
Age65   .486***   -.054  
IQ    .510***   -.161* 
        
R
2 
.679 .119 .236 .260 .703 .704 .715 
Adj. R
2
 .676 .111 .229 .253 .697 .696 .707 
Note: Regression coefficients are standardized betas. All regressions are estimated using White‟s 
heteroskedasticity correction. 
*** p<.001, ** p<.01, and * p<.05. 
Reading example:  As Model 7 shows, a one standard deviation increase in IQ would reduce 
Insurance by a standard deviation of .161.  
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Table 7 
Summary of regression analysis after excluding one region at a time.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable:  private health insurance expenditure per capita, Insurance 
Excluded Region  
Model 1: 
East Asia
a
 
Model 2: 
Latin America
b
 
Model 3: 
Africa
c
 
Model 4: 
Persian Gulf
d
 
Income 1.049*** 1.093*** 1.005*** 1.101*** 
Gov -.173* -.174* -.214** -.150* 
IQ -.176* -.195* -.098 -.248** 
     
N  105 90 84 103 
R
2 
.711 .749 .712 .730 
Adj. R
2
 .702 .741 .701 .721 
Note: Regression coefficients are standardized betas. All regressions are estimated using 
White‟s heteroskedasticity correction.  
*** p<.001, ** p<.01, and * p<.05. 
Reading example:  As Model 4 shows, a one standard deviation increase in IQ would reduce 
Insurance by a standard deviation of .248.  
a
 East Asia: China, Japan, and South Korea.  
b
 Latin America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.  
c
 Africa: Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Congo, Egypt, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Morocco, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, 
Seychelles, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tunisia, and Zambia.  
d
 Persian Gulf: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia.  
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Table 8 
Summary of regression analysis after excluding both the Persian Gulf and one other region at 
a time.  
 
 
Dependent variable:  private health insurance expenditure per capita, Insurance 
Excluded Region  
Model 1: 
East Asia
a
 +   Persian 
Gulf
d
 
Model 2: 
Latin America
b
 +   
Persian Gulf
d
 
Model 3: 
Africa
c
 +   Persian 
Gulf
d
 
Income 1.122*** 1.162*** 1.076*** 
Gov -.141* -.152* -.169* 
IQ -.280** -.290** -.214** 
    
N  100 85 79 
R
2 
.728 .766 .736 
Adj. R
2
 .719 .757 .725 
Note: Regression coefficients are standardized betas. All regressions are estimated using 
White‟s heteroskedasticity correction.  
*** p<.001, ** p<.01, and * p<.05.  
Reading example:  As Model 3 shows, a one standard deviation increase in IQ would reduce 
Insurance by a standard deviation of .214.  
a
 East Asia: China, Japan, and South Korea.  
b
 Latin America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.  
c
 Africa: Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Congo, Egypt, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Morocco, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, 
Seychelles, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tunisia, and Zambia.  
d
 Persian Gulf : Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia.   
